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SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES: MALU MALU RETURNS ... AND DEPARTS

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Amani program Coordinator Malu Malu said May 27 that provincial-level working groups implementing disengagement decisions of the Joint Commission on Peace and Security must trump Nkunda's insistence on subcommittee-level cells manned from the field. Although Amani is strapped for cash, Malu Malu is satisfied that the finance minister is distributing its funds properly and understands its future needs. Lack of money cast a long shadow over the May 28-29 initial attempts to reconvene the Commission following the public awareness program, as the co-presidents struggled to manage South Kivu Mai-Mai demands for immediate guaranteed benefits. Privately, Malu Malu raised concerns about the continued absence of the FRF from the process, and Mai-Mai establishment of several irregular "pre-cantonment" sites. The Commission has yet to confront the massive IDP and refugee problem. End summary.

Malu Malu back on scene  
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¶2. (SBU) Amani Program National Coordinator Apollinaire Malu Malu made a timely return to Goma May 27. He did not immediately step onto the stage but first consulted with representatives of the International Facilitation about re-starting the work of the Joint Commission on Peace and Security, and reiterated his vision of where the Amani program stands.

¶3. (SBU) Malu Malu said he wanted all members of the Commission to be present in Goma, including the FRF, even if it claims it wants to resign. He insisted that growing arguments about brassage not overlap onto disengagement questions. He favored immediate action on three fronts.

-- First, the international community should endorse and finance the Kimoka "peace camp."

-- Second, the Commission should initiate a new public awareness campaign for representatives of armed groups to speak to communities other than their own, in order to broaden understanding of the Amani program. The Commission would select and deputize these agents.

-- Third, the Commission must name provincial staff for four working groups who will be not just the best people for the job, but also the best representatives of the Commission.

Facilitation representatives cautioned that Nkunda's vision of provincial staff conflicts with the working group model. Nkunda thinks that staffers, who would include himself, should be of the field and in the field, operating small implementation cells. Malu Malu was unfazed.

¶4. (SBU) Malu Malu was also remarkably cool about Amani's cash shortage. He was certain that everyone would be paid at the end of the month and that the finance minister could make new funds available without inviting criticism from the IMF or World Bank. After all, he said, the Commission is a short-term institution, and

gets no long-term cushion. (Note: Malu Malu seemed unaware that Facilitation donors had agreed the previous week in Kinshasa they could not now unblock new money for Amani. End note.)

#### South Kivu armed groups

15. (SBU) Commission Co-President Admiral Didier Etumba found two important groups absent on his return to the Commission May 28: CNDP members were delayed by transportation problems, and FRF was (presumably) boycotting. A quorum was likely present, but Etumba did not convene the meeting, apparently sensing the possibility of a confrontation with representatives of South Kivu armed groups (i.e., Mai-Mai).

16. (SBU) The following day, these groups insisted on